Although talks between Madheshi Front and government representatives are still continuing, events over the past few weeks have materialized in a way that indicates a weakening of Madheshi resolve to push for a meaningful settlement of the disputed features of the new constitution relating, in main part, to the delineation of provincial boundaries and recognition of Madheshis' civil rights. The dispute now has gone on for over three months that has led to lots of violence and has caused public hardships because of interruptions of supplies coming from India.
Internal media reports as well as assessments provided by outside human rights groups have provided horrific details of heavy-handed response by government security forces, including many instances of extra-judicial killings of protesters. The violence and killings have stopped over past weeks but the situation remains uncertain and precarious, with the likelihood of eruption at the slightest provocation from either side, and another round of flare-ups.
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It is now too early to say of the final resolution of Madhesh protests but outside indicators are that the movement has lost steam and credibility of its leadership strengthening government to seek a favorable bargain in the resolution of the dispute. This relates to the behavior of Madheshi leadership during the course of voting for new Prime Minister early this month to confirm PM Koirala in the job or else choose a new one. In the election held on October 11, Koirala lost the contest and was replaced by a veteran UML politician, Khadga Prasad (KP) Oli.
However, it was nothing less than in the nature of extraordinary politics for the agitating Madheshi parties to rush to participate in the election because both Koirala and Oli had been unsupportive of Madhesh agitation.
Madheshi parties had been waging war against the new constitution that coalition NC-UML government had promulgated in early June. Anti-Madheshi tone of the constitution and, in large part, of denial of Madhesh-only regional boundaries of districts in Madhesh had incited a strong backlash from Madheshi public that led to violence and bloodshed all across Madhesh, with reports of atrocities committed by armed security personnel facing unarmed Madheshi crowds.
Deaths of some four dozen demonstrators that involved a number of extra-judicial killings of onlookers to the confrontation inflamed emotions and enraged the public in the grassroots who rose up to place blockades of transport routes linking India to points in the hills, including Kathmandu. Government called the transport interruption as Indian government's ploy against Nepal and blamed Indian "intruders" for troubles in Madhesh.
The strength of this massive showdown with Kathmandu, however, was undercut by the decision of choosing Prime Minister through parliamentary voting, instead of doing so by consensus. The expectation from Madheshi agitators—public as well as grassroots cadres—was that Madheshi parties would just boycott the election for the simple reason that any such participation will give legitimacy to government's handling of Madhesh protests and, in any case, the election of a new PM will not help advance Madheshi cause or soften government stance on Madheshi demands. The logical choice for Madheshi leaders was then to stay out of the election or put up its own candidate to assert their independence.
But no such consensus or magnanimity prevailed in Madheshi leadership and, instead, they rushed to participate in the election in the usual manner, to curry favor with the new leadership: not to bargain for Madhesh but how they would be rewarded for their effort to sway the election outcome. Reportedly, all or most of Madhesi-parties' parliamentarians voted for Koirala who, however, lost the election but, nonetheless, Madheshi Morcha leader Bijay Gachhedar was smart enough to secure a plum-position in the Oli-led government.
Will the Madhesh agitation continue and, if it does, what direction will it take? Of the first question, it is fair to say that despite loss of earlier force, agitation in Madhesh region has continued which, most observers expect, will gather force once Dashain festivities are over. Government still claims that India has refused to lift its trade blockade of Nepal which, however, has repeatedly been denied by Indian government, saying that trade obstructions have resulted from Nepal's internal problems—agitation by Madheshi parties—which the Government of Nepal must solve to help normalize border crossings. On his part, ex-Prime Minister Sushil Koirala has advised Oli that he should address the [Madheshi] demands at the earliest as it is the only way end the present crisis.
It looks though that, from the Nepal side, there seems to be no special urgency of solving the Madhesh problem, despite obvious hardships the three-month long agitation has caused to the general public, especially in Kathmandu. The feeling is that the government has intentionally prolonged the conflict to discredit India. International press coverage of hardships faced by Kathmandu residents has received wide publicity that has blamed India's bad diplomacy intended to subdue Nepal.
It is difficult to predict which side gets the upper-hand. But whichever way an amicable solution to the present stand-off does get negotiated, it is certain that final agreement on ending of the border dispute with India will not favor Madheshis as laid out in the seven-point revision to the new constitution that Indian government had suggested Nepal to consider. Probably, Oli will agree to a couple of weaker and marginal points of constitution revision but the mega proposals such as Madhesh-only provinces and distribution of electoral districts will most likely be bypassed or touched upon only in the passing without any enforceable commitment for implementation.
In other words, both sides will go for the lowest common denominator as a face-saving device which wouldn't look like Nepal yielding to India's pressures. India also will be mindful of its image that has come under attack by pro-ethnic lobby in Nepal, supported by government-sponsored social media offshoots outside the country.
The most likely scenario that emerges is Madhesh uprising ending at the point it had started, which is of accepting the status quo as laid out in the new constitution that, in most part, formalizes the ethnic-domination of Nepali state. Madheshis will fare no better or worse than how they have under previous administrations and previous constitutions that provided no special place for them and, as such, didn't recognize their disadvantaged existence beyond formalities of citizenship and equal rights allowed under the law.
There is nothing much on the horizon that these generic and standard provisions in the constitution will guide government policy to benefit Madheshis in any substantive ways than what they have experienced through generations prior to Madhesh Movement 2007.
There is no denying that Madhesh issue has now come to a dead-end, which is that Madheshis will get no better accommodation in new Nepal than they had in old Nepal. This means that they will continue to be an invisible majority in the country with their numerical strength having little to do with accommodation of their culture, language, geography, and their Madheshiness.
All of these will remain the sole possession of dominant ethnic group that has given the country its separate identity and fought mighty British to safeguard independence. Madheshis have contributed nothing to this nation-building effort. So they can't be allowed to claim equal status or given a role in running the government.
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