The professionalism and commitment was amply in view when the army relentlessly fought back the rebel attacks, once it was finally deployed on the field, through the government decision. It is important to highlight the NA’s record against the rebels, for this aspect has got sidelined amidst the loss of image suffered by the army for having been used by the former king, Gyanendra, in his takeover of 2005. The contribution and sacrifice of Nepal’s security forces, the officers and the men, in preventing collapse of the state during the conflict years must be brought before the general populace.
ATTACK ON DANG
The Maoists rebels’ attack at the NA barracks in Dang, in November 2001 was a grave setback for the NA, calling into question its readiness and training. The army suffered its first casualties of the conflict period, and Major Naresh Upreti died a hero’s death trying to save his company. The whole nation was shocked and everything looked grim, given the surprise nature of the attack, and that the rebels were able to make away with the entire stock of arms and ammunitions in the Dang barracks.
Fortunately, the NA was quick to learn from its setbacks. The rebels tried to follow their success in Dang by attacking NA posts in other parts of the country. The Solu-Salleri post under the command of young Lieutenant Binod Chand, was one of the targets on which the rebels pinned their hopes of success in the eastern hills. Lt Chand had less than 30 men under his command when several hundred rebels tried to swamp his post. While suffering casualties from the beginning, Lt Chand and his soldiers stood fast and successfully defended their post against overwhelming odds.
The success in Solu-Salleri was followed by the successes in the other parts of the country, including in Raato Maate and Kapur Kot. In both the places, the young officers Bishwaraj Thapa and Narayan Thapa showed excellent leadership. They led their men valiantly and together they fought and defeated rebels who had attacked them with overwhelming force of numbers.
The contribution and sacrifice of Nepal’s security forces, the officers and the men, in preventing collapse of the state during the conflict years must be brought before the general populace.
What these young men and officers did was to simply carry out their assigned tasks as an army should. They guarded small outposts in remote places, away from civilization and with rudimentary facilities, lacking electricity, running water, even proper bunks. In these posts, the soldiers never exceeded 40 in number, and lived under constant threat of ambush. Even collection of drinking water had to be carried out under such threat.
For all the publicity generated about the US and the NATO troops in the outposts in Afghanistan, the Nepali soldiers functioned in much more dangerous and difficult conditions and with much less firepower. The soldiers had to perform without hope of reinforcements or replenishments, and what did arrive was mostly by air. A populace cowed by the threats of violence from the rebels knew to keep aloof, so there was not even the camaraderie with the locals that is so natural in the Nepali hills and plains. Like true defenders of the nation, the NA officers and soldiers never questioned orders and simply carried out their tasks.
ADVANTAGES OF TRAINING
An army must be capable of carrying out their ceremonial duties along with their traditional tasks. Because the public mostly sees the army in parades, and the Ghode Jatra and Shivaratri and other functions at Tundikhel, there is a belief that the NA is mostly ceremonial. The conflict years proved otherwise, though certainly there were initial setbacks for the army command being caught unawares.
Unbeknownst to the larger public, the training in the NA is of true international standard, both for officers and soldiers, despite the low pay, lack of basic requirements, and absence of high-end equipment that even the other armies of South Asia have at their command. It was this inherent quality of the NA, based on years of training that came to the fore when the nation demanded service. When the time came, the soldiers rose to the occasion and saved the nation from disaster. It is a fact that within a year of the NA’s deployment, the rebels were forced to come to the negotiating table. In essence, they sued for peace, whatever spin the latter day analysts may put on the history of the last years of the conflict. The time spent on training had not gone to waste.
It is true that the combat experience gained by the NA in its fight against the insurgents has helped it perform better in its United Nations peace support missions. Even before the conflict, due to the excellent training, the Nepali Battalion serving with the UN Mission (‘NepBatt’) has always performed well wherever in the world it has been deployed, whether Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, East Timor, Burundi, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Congo. Presently, it is serving in Haiti and helping it rebuild itself after the disastrous earthquake.
The reason for the NepBatt to be a sought-after UN force has to do with the innate quality of the Nepali soldier, in terms of neutrality and absence of prejudice. Most important has been the quality of service. The other advantage in international missions has been the clear mandate given to NepBatt, unlike what happened during the conflict period in our country vis-à-vis the army and the government. Hence, foreign colleagues have asked NA officers, “How come you are always so successful in UN but not so successful in your own country?”
FOLLOWING PROCEDURE
An army is a national tool, to be used with caution and full oversight. It can and should be deployed after some procedures are followed, to avoid possibility of misuse and politicization. The army should be mobilized, firstly, on the basis of a formal cabinet decision rather than the whims and fancies of a single person. Great criticism is directed at the NA for not supporting the police during the infamous rebels attack in Dunai, but the simple fact is that at the time the cabinet had not taken any decision to deploy the army to fight the insurgents. No matter how regretful the episode, it was not possible for the army to come to the aid of the beleaguered policemen. The Dunai episode is a lesson for the politicians of Nepal more than for the NA which is already democratized to the extent that the command of the army is now completely in the hands of an elected government.
It is not that everything went well with the NA during the conflict. It suffered from mistakes, but it showed the ability to learn from the setbacks. The Maoists of Nepal used the same tactics as used by the Viet Cong during the early days of the Vietnam War, wiping out village headmen, destroying police posts and neutralizing the government’s presence in the remote areas. In the process, in large parts, the government had rapidly lost control of the villages beyond the district headquarters.
Contrast this withdrawal of the government with the experience of the NA. Whenever the NA lost a post, the same was always re-established and reinforced. When the company post was lost in Dang, a Brigade HQ was established there. The NA lost a post of about 55 soldiers in Arghakhanchi and about same in Achham, and in both instances battalions were located there.
No government of a proud nation-state should lose control of any area of its territory, and it is a fact that the NA did not allow this to happen even though there are some in the international community who believe the canard that the rebels controlled 80 percent of the territory.
Presently, we are beginning to hear that police posts are being attacked in eastern Nepal and in the Tarai. The government must learn the lesson from the conflict years, and never allow territory to go out of its control. Today there is the Armed Police Force, and it can be used to reinforce and make stronger government presence where it has been weakened. That is what the people deserve. They must not be abandoned again and left at the mercy of insurgents. The lessons learnt, with the participation of the NA, must be utilized to protect the nation in future. Otherwise, all the sacrifices of the past would have been made in vain.
(Brig Gen Dipak Gurung (retired) was spokesman for Nepal Army, 2002–2006.)
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