This feeling was more evident when the Maoists also intensified recruitment drive soon after the Nepal Army (NA) got a go-ahead from the Supreme Court to fill up its 3,464 positions for infantry division in August. Such efforts and counter-efforts have complicated the integration process and intensified the political stalemate.
However, there have been a few positive indications lately about the integration process since the tenure of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was extended by four months by the UN Security Council (UNSC). The UNSC resolution states that UNMIN will leave Nepal on Jan 15, 2011. Political parties are now under pressure to integrate and rehabilitate 19,532 combatants by that time. The consensus for constituting a 12-member secretariat including heads of the security bodies and the agreement to bring the combatants under the Special Committee is a tiny step in the right direction. However, there is a long way to go ahead.
The Maoists have been demanding that all of their fighters be integrated in the NA while the other political parities want them to be integrated in other security bodies as well. The Maoist leadership also contends that their combatants should be integrated as per the international experiences rather than the existing recruitment standards of the security agencies. This has caused a major difference because other political parties like Nepali Congress and CPN-UML want the integration in line with national and international security "recruitment standards".
Another political difference lies in the Maoists’ demand of ´mass entry´ of its combatants with the creation of a separate battalion or regiment within the security forces. The "mass entry for a separate regiment" within the national security bodies can in no way be integration in true sense of the term. It would rather be ´isolation´, which eventually would create a feeling of "us and them" among the security personnel. Many believe that creating a separate group would be detrimental to national sovereignty.
With less than 100 days left, parties have no option except ironing out procedural and technical differences relating to the integration process. Prevailing confusion over the number of Maoist fighters to be integrated into NA and the rank to be given to them can be a bone of contention among political parties. This is the most difficult part of the integration process requiring a lot of brainstorming before we jumpstart the integration process. Experience shows that rebel combatants were not given high positions in countries like South Africa and El Salvador during integration.
As the integration process is inalienably linked to the constitution-writing process, one is not possible without the other. The Maoist leadership must understand that integration is not always about putting its fighters in the national army alone. They can equally be integrated into the police and armed police forces. A new security body can also be formed by integrating certain number of government forces and the Maoist combatants for providing security to the industries, borders and powerhouses including many other sectors. Ample options and areas can be explored for the integration but this will call for a broad-based political consensus.
A DUE PROCESS
Integration by its nature is a lengthy process that takes place in different phases over a specific time. Integration is not a new practice as it has been already accepted as an unavoidable part of the peace process in many countries emerging out of an armed conflict. As integration is a step-wise process, it may be difficult to complete it at one go because of the many procedural and technical intricacies involved in it. However, the steps referred below may guide and facilitate the integration process in the coming months.
The consensus for constituting a 12-member secretariat including heads of the security bodies and the agreement to bring the combatants under the Special Committee is a tiny step in the right direction. However, there is a long way to go ahead.
As a first step, the Maoist combatants will have to be immediately brought under the control of Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation, which has now been agreed in principle. Putting them within a government command system will end a state of two armies. Similarly, as a second step, a task force needs to be formed to finalize "recruitment standards" based on military norms and values, and initiate final selection process to fix their actual number to be integrated into the national army and in other security bodies.
Thirdly, those select Maoist combatants eligible for integration will have to be de-politicized and de-listed as political party members through a public swearing-in ceremony. On basis of international military norms, security personnel cannot harbor any political preferences and ideologies. As a fourth step, those combatants who make it to the final selection process should be psychologically groomed and professionally engaged in trainings over a time because such engagement will help create a sense of belonging that they are a part of the government security system. It would also facilitate and harmonize their estranged relations with each other as the combatants come from a politically-indoctrinated background. These four steps should be completed within the next three months at the longest.
We should also get rid of the prevailing fallacy that integration is merely putting a classified number of Maoist combatants in the army or in any other national security structure. Real integration is involves social, psychological, attitudinal and professional orientation of the combatants over a time. Therefore, the major political parties should immediately devise "action plan" for integration.
Meanwhile, Nepal also needs to redefine its security sector through a new National Security Policy in a changed context envisioning possible security threats, challenges and risks amidst rapidly changing regional and global security scenario. The strength of NA now stands at 95,753, of which 2,500 positions are vacant. If the existing number of Maoist combatants are integrated into the national army, its total size will be somewhere around 115,000. Do we really need downsizing? We need a fresh debate into the issue taking into account the changing geo-politics of South Asia, especially with reference to possible security challenges and threats Nepal might face in the future.
HOW OTHERS DID IT?
Many conflict-hit countries have successfully implemented integration processes. Studies show that about 45 military integrations took place from 1945 to 1999. Of these, 23 countries alone belong to Africa. It indicates that integration is not a new phenomenon to the world. And many countries with armed conflict in history have accepted military integration as a part and parcel of their peace processes.
The UN has played the role of third-party facilitator during these integration processes. In Mozambique, about 11,000 rebel armies were integrated into their national army in 1992. Similarly, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rebels singed a peace agreement in 2002 ending 27 years of armed conflict in Angola. 20,000 UNITA rebels were inducted into the Angolan national army, which is now around 50,000 in number.
The National Defense Force in Burundi constitutes 50 percent of Tutsis and 50 percent from National Liberation Forces known as Hutu rebels. However, Burundi is still facing some post-integration tensions. Even in El Salvador, 30 percent of Salvadoran rebels were inducted into the national army. Much in the same way, the national army of Chad has integrated former rebels into its national security body. Mali and Cambodia also inducted a certain number of former rebels into their armies during the peace process.
pbhattarai2001@gmail.com
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