Airline business by its very nature is capital intensive, and that is precisely why in the early days of commercial aviation governments chose to run it in order to avoid at being at a disadvantage viś-a-viś other nations when it came to utilizing seat capacities that were made available by mutual agreements. The business is also highly regulated as the stakes (financial and risk) are high and comprehensive international treaties govern its various aspects. This regulation is carried out by an institution that goes by the name of Directorate General of Civil Aviation or the DGCA as is commonly known. The DGCA is involved in all aspects of airline operations whether it is financial assessment, aircraft operations or certification of flight crew. The basic premise for the issuance of authorization (technically called air-operator certificate) to an airline operator is the adequacy of its financial strength for implementing the stipulated technical requirements that are universal in nature. The continuation of this authorization also depends on the airline’s remaining strong financially, again for safety reasons. However, in these days of stiff competition when a host of airlines have sprung up, it is a commonly held notion that the market forces will prevail allowing only the fittest to survive. The problem with this argument is that the not-so-fit will gradually degrade into non-compliance with safety norms while desperately cutting corners to remain in business before eventually perishing. And it is this phase of floundering where systematic safety violations begin to occur, some manifesting in incidents while others in accidents. Unfortunately, the big-wigs of the industry utilize their clout, both political and financial, to arm twist the DGCA into turning a blind eye toward these violations for as long as possible thus imperiling the lives of the traveling public.
During the past decade of booming Indian aviation, clearly not much attention was paid to the quality of manpower being utilized for operations. The norms were routinely relaxed by the DGCA to accommodate the operator’s requests on critical areas of command experience, flight duty time etc, a fact echoed even by the Indian Commercial Pilot’s Association. The airline management was content focusing more on the aspects that caught the traveling public’s eye like catering and services while consigning serious issues to the backseat. These problems were further exacerbated as competing airlines struggled to cut costs to improve their seat occupancy through various schemes. While all this was happening, the DGCA itself remained under-equipped to maintain an effective oversight of the expanding airlines and take decisive steps. The objective state of Indian regulatory capabilities is vividly illustrated in the audit chart available to the public on the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAOs) website on flight safety information exchange (FSIX). And yet, ironically, the topmost officials of Indian aviation continue to be in complete denial mode in the aftermath of the Mangalore crash. Well, the same happens in Nepal in the aftermath of any unfortunate crash and no heads have ever rolled for accountability.
The Indian aviation community appeared jubilant at the retrieval of the flight recorders. However, the Black Boxes tell you what happened but they never tell you why it happened!
The authority of an ICAO member state to issue authorization to its flight crew is based on article 33 of its charter for flying aircraft registered in the state. This intent in recent times has been deliberately diluted to suit countries that face a shortage of trained manpower for operating aircraft. Out of the thousands of foreign pilots who have been to the US (or say Canada) for pilot training in the past, how many are flying for American (or Canadian) airlines? Not even a handful! Wonder why? Because these countries’ carriers have their own requirements for hiring pilots from graduates of four-year aviation schools and air force academies. Sometimes conditions arise when limited term authorizations have to be issued to foreign pilots (called foreign license validations certificates or the FLVC) for specific purposes like ferrying an aircraft from a manufacturer’s country or for training pilots on that particular aircraft type, but then these are done for very short periods.
Not many developed countries have regulations that allow foreign pilots to perform routine flying duties on regular commercial flights. For example, the regulatory provisions of Canada, a pioneer in aviation, specifically prohibit issuing FLVCs to foreign pilots to fly aircraft belonging to Canadian airlines. Not only are there cross-cultural problems on the flight deck when FLVCs are issued for regular commercial flights, but there are also legal problems when holding the pilots accountable for any violation of regulations. The legal purpose behind issuing a license is to make the individual accountable and the aviation license is a privilege that can be revoked if the applicable norms are not met, but then it is only the state that issues the license that can revoke or suspend it.
Merely revoking the FLVCs have little or no salutary effect on the errant individual as he remains free to try his luck elsewhere and therefore the deterrent nature of the penalty imposed stands thoroughly undermined. Besides, the FLVC’s validity can’t exceed that of the original license and ratings, which must be renewed periodically by the state of issuance. Here too, the issuing state may not be able to verify the renewal requirements that include compliance with its own regulations, which may not be the same where the pilot has been exercising his privileges on the FLVC!
The Indian aviation community appeared jubilant at the retrieval of the flight recorders or the Black Boxes of the Mangalore crash and appeared content that all the mysteries would be unraveled very soon. On the contrary, it is a well-accepted theory in aviation academia that the Black Boxes might tell you what happened but they may never tell you why it happened! Unraveling the minds of the flight crew involved in a crash is a distinct academic discipline called aviation psychology that is yet to evolve in this part of the world. Airworthiness engineers and pilots in the probe panel just cannot be its replacement.
Last but not the least, though amusing, is the issue of granting further autonomy to the DGCA as stated by the Indian minister while announcing the constitution of the court of inquiry for the Mangalore crash. Can’t it be assumed therefore that the Indian DGCA has been functioning under “some” constraints, contrary to the ICAO norms? If it is so, albeit late, it remains to be seen how much autonomy would be conferred upon the fundamental regulatory authority on civil aviation.
pilots_nepal@yahoo.com
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