POLITICS

BRI caught between Beijing's ambitions and Kathmandu's caution

Nine years after signing the BRI agreement with China, Nepal has yet to implement a single new project as disagreements over financing, political divisions and geopolitical sensitivities continue to hold back the initiative.
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By Ishwari Subedi

KATHMANDU, Nov 18: Nine years after Nepal and China signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the ambitious connectivity and infrastructure partnership remains largely on paper. Not a single new project under the initiative has entered implementation, with disagreements over financing, concerns about debt risks and political differences continuing to stall progress.



Even as successive governments have reaffirmed their commitment to cooperation with China, the question of how Nepal intends to proceed with the BRI remains unanswered. The position of the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP)-led government is also far from clear.


Nepal and China signed the BRI MoU on May 12, 2017, when Pushpa Kamal Dahal was prime minister. Then Foreign Secretary Shanker Das Bairagi and Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Yu Hong signed the agreement at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Then Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Krishna Bahadur Mahara and Foreign Minister Dr Prakash Sharan Mahat were present at the ceremony. A few days later, Mahara led the Nepali delegation to the first Belt and Road Forum in Beijing.


However, the initial agreement failed to establish a clear mechanism for implementing projects. Nor did Nepal formally endorse the implementation plan proposed by China. After more than seven years of little progress, the two countries signed the Framework for Belt and Road Cooperation in Beijing on December 4, 2024, during then Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli's visit to China.


The framework sought to bring greater clarity to bilateral cooperation under the BRI. It allows projects financed through either grants or loans to be included in the initiative and recognizes bilateral cooperation with China under the BRI. Valid for three years, it also contains a provision for automatic extension.


Yet, the framework failed to resolve the most contentious issue: financing.


The Nepali Congress (NC), which had previously maintained that Nepal should accept only grant financing, agreed to the broader term 'aid financing' in the framework. The wording, however, left room for different interpretations, as it could encompass both grants and loans.


A CPN-UML leader said the NC had accepted the terminology during meetings of the high-level political mechanism formed to facilitate the Oli-led coalition government. The mechanism included Gagan Thapa, Purna Bahadur Khadka, Ramesh Lekhak and Arzu Rana from the NC, and Ishwar Pokhrel, Bishnu Paudel, Shankar Pokhrel and Bishnu Rimal from the UML.


But Mahat, a senior NC leader and former foreign minister, maintains that his party never agreed to loan financing.


"'Aid financing' can have two meanings. It can include grants that do not have to be repaid as well as concessional loans provided at low interest rates for a long period. If it is a grant, that is fine. But there is always a risk that it could later be presented as a loan," Mahat said.


He said the NC remained committed to grant financing, under which assistance provided for development projects does not have to be repaid.


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Nearly two years after the framework was signed, however, no project has moved into implementation. Critics say the BRI has so far delivered more symbolic achievements than tangible infrastructure.


Each proposed project requires separate negotiations and agreements. The Project Development Agreement (PDA) for the China-Nepal Friendship Industrial Park in Damak, for instance, remains unsigned, despite then Prime Minister Oli laying its foundation stone in 2021.


The biggest shift in the BRI debate, meanwhile, has come from Nepal's changing political landscape.


Following the Gen Z movement of September 8 and 9, 2025, an interim government was formed under former Chief Justice Sushila Karki. The subsequent elections on March 5, 2026, brought the RSP to power with 182 of the 275 seats in the House of Representatives. Balendra Shah was sworn in as prime minister on March 27.


The new government's approach to the BRI remains uncertain, particularly as questions grow over whether it should honour previous commitments and under what conditions it should take forward the proposed projects.


Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal sought to reassure Beijing during a meeting with the Chinese ambassador on April 8, saying Nepal's policy toward China would remain unchanged. In a response sent to China on May 25, the government also expressed its commitment to the proposed cross-border transmission line linking Chilime and Kerung.


The government's policies and programmes for fiscal year 2026/27 mention developing a cross-border railway with China, signalling continued interest in connectivity projects.


Khanal's June 14-17 visit to China, his first since the new government took office, offered further indications of Nepal's position. During the visit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed Beijing's willingness to advance cooperation under the BRI in areas including power transmission lines, roads, ports and air services.


According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese side also expressed readiness to accelerate projects already agreed upon. Khanal, for his part, said Nepal welcomed Chinese investment and would ensure a fair investment environment.


However, a Nepali analyst said Khanal had emphasized that the economic viability of each project should be assessed before any decision was made.


The analyst also said Prime Minister Shah had advised RSP leaders and lawmakers currently visiting China to exercise caution on the BRI. Shah reportedly suggested that they explore whether loans taken for projects such as airports could be converted into grants.


Shah's own election commitments had offered an indication of this cautious approach. An analyst at India's Observer Research Foundation said the prime minister's decision to drop the proposed China-Nepal Industrial Park in Damak from his election commitments was significant.


According to the analyst, Beijing has also been concerned about the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and State Partnership Program, and is closely watching the direction of Nepal's foreign policy.


Chinese analyst Professor Zhang Jiadong, however, argued that the change of government should not affect bilateral cooperation. He said political stability in Nepal would help advance China-Nepal ties and that Beijing's policy toward Nepal would not change simply because governments changed.


The uncertainty surrounding the BRI is also reflected in the changing list of proposed projects. Nepal initially proposed 35 projects under the initiative, but the list was reduced to nine at China's request, according to IANS. When the cooperation framework was signed in December 2024, the two sides included 10 projects.


These include the Tokha-Chhahare tunnel, Hilsa-Simikot road, Kimathanka-Khandbari road and bridge, Jilong-Kerung-Kathmandu cross-border railway, Jilong-Kerung-Rasuwagadhi-Chilime 220 kV transmission line, Amargadhi City Hall in Dadeldhura, Madan Bhandari University, Kathmandu Science Center and Museum, China-Nepal Friendship Industrial Park in Damak, and the Jhapa Sports Complex.


Progress on these projects has been uneven, with most still at the study or negotiation stage.


An aerial survey of the proposed railway has been completed, and drilling and soil testing were expected to begin in 2026. However, as of May, work remained limited to the feasibility study of the Kerung-Kathmandu railway.


Nepal and China have also exchanged letters to advance the approximately 95-96 km Hilsa-Simikot road project. But such preparatory steps have yet to translate into actual construction.


The Damak Industrial Park is another example of the gap between political commitments and implementation. Although Oli laid its foundation stone in 2021, the PDA has yet to be finalized. Mahat said none of the projects listed under the BRI had actually started.


Former Nepali ambassador to India Nilamber Acharya said Nepal should decide whether to accept grants or loans based on its national interests, rights and the suitability of individual projects.


He said Nepal should seek to benefit from cooperation with China, a neighbouring country emerging as one of the world's major powers.


Disagreements over what constitutes a BRI project have further complicated the debate. China considers the Pokhara Regional International Airport a major BRI achievement, but Nepal does not recognize it as a project under the initiative. Mahat said negotiations for the airport had begun before Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the BRI.


Similarly, the 480 MW Phukot Karnali hydropower project, initially proposed under the BRI, is now being developed through a joint venture between India's NHPC and Nepal Electricity Generation Company. The case illustrates the distinction between projects listed under the initiative and those actually implemented through BRI arrangements.


China has repeatedly pushed Nepal to move forward with agreements on the proposed projects. During Dahal's 2023 visit to China, the two sides had prepared to finalize an implementation plan. Oli's 2024 visit resulted in the cooperation framework. Yet, neither effort has produced a project that has entered implementation.


Financing remains a major sticking point. Mahat told IANS that Nepal needs clarity on whether projects would receive grants or loans, the interest rates applicable to loans and the extent to which Chinese manpower, materials and technical resources would be used.


He argued that the BRI would be difficult to implement if Nepal had to borrow money while Chinese companies were also expected to secure construction contracts and supply materials and engineers.


Nepal has been reluctant to take high-interest commercial loans for large infrastructure projects, particularly at a time when concerns over debt sustainability have grown.


Political differences have compounded the financing dilemma. Leftist parties have highlighted the potential benefits of Chinese-backed infrastructure, while the NC and some smaller parties have warned against the possibility of a debt trap. According to IANS, the NC hardened its position after perceiving that China was seeking to bring leftist political forces together.


The debate has also been shaped by wider regional and geopolitical concerns. China's involvement in projects such as the Hambantota Port International and Port City Colombo in Sri Lanka, as well as India's objections to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have fuelled wider questions about the BRI's economic and strategic implications.


For Nepal, caught between two powerful neighbours, the challenge is to pursue infrastructure development without compromising its economic interests or foreign policy autonomy.


Nine years after signing the initial MoU, the BRI remains caught between political promises and practical disagreements. Until Nepal and China settle the financing question, establish clear implementation arrangements and reach a political consensus at home, the initiative is unlikely to move beyond agreements, feasibility studies and diplomatic assurances.

See more on: BRI agreement
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