The CIAA has been a victim of political cronyism, manipulation and political conflict of interest. It has been functioning without its head for more than two years now. This is, without any doubt, a height of political irresponsibility and recklessness. This “political apathy” is a farce to political parties themselves. If they cannot even appoint chief commissioner to the CIAA, what else can we expect from them in their pledges to controlling corruption?
Six months ago, the government appointed former Additional Inspector General (AIG) of the Nepal Police Keshav Baral to the post of a commissioner at the CIAA. The appointment was hastily made in the wake of the retirement of the only two remaining commissioners Lalit Bahadur Limbu and Bed Prasad Shiwakoti on January 4, 2010. With this appointment, a very simple question has arisen: What can a lone commissioner accomplish without a full-fledged team? The CIAA has a constitutional provision for five commissioners.
The Constitutional Council is a statutory body to recommend appointments to the constitutional bodies. But due to conflict of political interests, it has been a tradition among the political parties to finalize the appointees’ in advance and formalize decisions through the Constitutional Council later. For a year now, Constitutional Council has not been able to meet in the absence of political consensus.
It is an opportune time to review structure, legal mandate and investigation modality of the CIAA before we replicate it in federal system. What should be done to reduce “politicization” to make it an effective anti-corruption body in federal Nepal?
As we are drafting a new constitution, it is an opportune time to review structure, legal mandate and investigation modality of the CIAA before we replicate it in federal system. What should be done to reduce “politicization” to make it a neutral, stronger and an effective anti-corruption body in federal Nepal ? If we could correct and redress structural loopholes and legal lapses of the CIAA based on our past experiences, we can indeed make it a powerful and effective anti-graft agency in new Nepal.
It may be a replica of CIAA as each province needs a separate constitutional agency. As there has not been much debate, what modality of such anti-graft agency will be institutionalized in federal system is not yet clear. There are some core areas, aspects, values and principles which must be considered to empower CIAA to make it more effective and stronger.
The existing investigation system is one core area for immediate reform. CIAA’s reactive approach could not yield much result in the past. If fight against corruption is to be effective, investigation modality should involve both the reactive and proactive approach. Currently, CIAA doesn’t have a proactive approach like that of the Central Bureau of Investigation in India and anti-corruption agencies in other places such as Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore.
Another concern is that the anti-graft body in a federal system should be highly resourced and manned by a strong and vibrant intelligence body, own surveillance mechanism and a proactive investigation method. It also needs to have a pool of trained informants and whistleblowers to tip off malpractices, fraud and corruption that go unnoticed.
Yet another area for reform is its legal jurisdiction. The CIAA Act 2048 (2nd Amendment) has mandated it to concern itself with corruption only in the public sector. When we envisage CIAA in a new federal system, the legal outreach should be extended to the private sector, Non Government Organizations (NGOs), judiciary and army, bringing all of them within the investigation net.
It is estimated that the private sector, army and judiciary constitute 60 per cent of corruption in Nepal. Given the mandate, CIAA can investigate only public sector that constitutes only 40 per cent of corruption. How can we imagine a corruption-free society without bringing these sectors within the legal purview of such anti-graft body? Therefore, legal outreach dimensions CIAA should be a prime focus in federal system.
Staff composition and their recruitment process also impact anti-corruption efforts of such an institution. CIAA’s track record is already a proven fact. The provision of civil service staff to work with such an agency has to be scrapped to reduce politicization, divided loyalty and annual staff turnover. High staff turnover at the CIAA has also affected its anti-corruption endeavors. Thus, a separate service system for CIAA through an independent mechanism should be put in place to maintain professionalism, efficiency and political neutrality among the staff members. The system of recruiting staff through free competition for the CIAA service will give them better career prospects, generate motivation and commitment to corruption control.
The existing provision of making appointments to executive positions from among ex-government officers should be revisited because it is where the political parties exert pressure and influence. We have to devise ways to maintain check and balance to reduce such politicization and influence-peddling during appointments. Also an anti-corruption agency in a federal system should have “a core cadre” of staff trained in corruption investigation techniques, surveillance methods, commando training and culprit chasing techniques. It should also have an internal system of keeping surveillance upon its own staffs to avoid possible manipulation and malpractices within the anti-corruption agency.
With more than 15 years of experience, it has been felt that such an anti-graft constitutional body needs to be apolitical and internally strong to effectively spearhead an anti-corruption campaign. A complete overhaul of the anti-graft agency’s structure, workforce, investigation system, legal jurisdiction and power outreach dimensions will have to be seriously discussed to lend new momentum to the fight against corruption in new Nepal.
(Writer is Deputy Project Director, Good Governance Project, Pro Public.)
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