Among the opinion writers, however, there has been a stiff opposition to the 14-state model or anything that looks similar. The main concerns raised are that (i) it will disintegrate the country, (ii) it will benefit only the elite of the ethnic minorities, (iii) it will forever impoverish people in low resource states (iv) it ignores the plight of Dalits and (v) it is a populist model. These concerns, are, at best, unfounded, and, at worst, an expression of chauvinistic attitude with ulterior motive.
MYTH 1: IT WILL DISINTEGRATE NEPAL
If these states are given sufficient power like states in Canada, India, Belguim and Switzerland, it is unlikely that they will ask for another country. The leaders of these states will get so engulfed in solving the problems of their own state, that they won’t have the energy or the incentive to pick a fight with the central government. But if states are not given sufficient power as in Tibet and central government discriminates against these states, the fight against the central government will get fiercer.
The opponents use the example of countries like Ethiopia to make generalizations on what ethno-lingual federalism can lead to. There is a problem with this argument. First, there are numerous countries where ethno-lingual federalism has worked. Second, even in cases like Ethiopia where ethno-lingual federalism has been followed by strife, it is possible that the consequences would have been even worse if an alternative model had been used.
MYTH 2: IT’LL ONLY BENEFIT ELITE MADHESIS
It is true that the elite of the ethnic minority will reap the first benefits of this, but the rest will benefit too. The laws that they make and implement will protect the interest of ethnic minorities in general.
Madhesis and Janajatis don’t want to hang their hopes on Pahadi leaders. They want a Nepal where they have strong control and where they won’t be discriminated.
Opposition on this ground is reminiscent of opposition to one-third seat reservation for women in the Indian parliament. The opponents argue that benefits will only be reaped by urban women who speak English. It is true that an uneducated and shy woman from rural India is unlikely to become a member of parliament because of this law. But these rural women will still be better off because of this law. Urbane women legislators are more likely to protect a rural women’s interest than male legislators.
MYTH 3: UNITS WON’T NOT BE VIABLE
Anyone who makes this argument implicitly assumes that we can predict the economic value of resources in these states with reasonable accuracy. In reality, we can’t. How rich these states are going to be will depend mainly upon how they use their resources. For example, the Far Western region may look pretty impoverished judging by current income per capita, but if they were to have even one major power plant, and were allowed to keep 30 percent of the royalty, they could become one of the richest.
MYTH 4: THIS IS A POPULIST MODEL
This is elitism at play. If you believe in democracy, you should believe that a popular model is perhaps a good one. If you don’t, then it’s an example of contradiction. It can lead to, what psychologists call, cognitive dissonance.
MYTH 5: CONCERN OF DALITS WILL BE IGNORED
The concerns of Dalits are actually less likely to be ignored in the 14-state model. If we were to adopt any other kind of demarcation, the struggle of the Madhesis and Janajatis against the upper Nepali caste will continue unabated. As a result, the problems among the Madhesis and Janajatis, like discrimination against Dalits will get little attention. In contrast, a 14-state model will force the elite Madhesis and Janajatis to focus the debate on problems in their own communities.
THE REALITY: NORTH-SOUTH DIVISION’S A TRAP
While many opinion writers have expressed their angst against the ethno-lingual model, rarely have they proposed their map. An exception to this is Dr. Kanak Mani Dixit. He has spelled out his preference of North-South demarcation like the five development regions of the Panchayati regime. His main argument is that it will be easier to share resources, and each unit will have resources of a similar type. I will discuss why this model is not good even from a resource utilization perspective in some other article. But that is not the biggest problem. The biggest drawback of this model is that it ignores the frustration that Madhesis and Janjatis feel.
Dr. Dixit’s suggestion will lead to all five development regions with similar demographics. The power in all the five states will be in the hands of the upper caste Nepali speaking population. Collectively, this group does not believe that Madhesis have been discriminated against, or that they deserve positive discrimination.
Even if laws are made to assure special preference to Madhesis, they will not be implemented. If there is doubt on this, the current case of backtracking on recruitment of 3,000 Madhesis in the army, despite the cabinet decision, is a fitting example. In fact, this is just one example. The history is full of betrayal from Pahadi leaders when it comes addressing the marginalization issue of Madhesis and Janajatis.
That is why Madhesis or Janajati don’t want to hang their hope on the promises made by Pahadi leaders. They want at least a part of Nepal, where they have a strong control, where they know they will not be discriminated against. The 14-state model is their best insurance. Their concerns are genuine, and their demand is reasonable. Together, they represent more than 40 percent of the population. Forcefully suppressing their demand can be futile. What more, their population is concentrated, creating an ideal platform for revolt.
Even from a purely selfish perspective of the Pahadi population, it may be wiser to agree upon demarcation similar to the proposed 14-state model.
The writer is an Assistant Professor of Economics and Finance at Texas A&M International University in Texas
680anand@gmail.com