The first Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru, had a big influence in shaping India’s foreign policy, especially since he also occupied the portfolio of Foreign Minister of independent India. He was often charged by his opponents of being an idealist, who overlooked the country’s immediate needs and kept himself engaged mostly in international politics to enhance his prestige and popularity world over. During Nehru’s time, the Indian foreign policy seemed to oscillate between personal idealism and national realism.
This personal idealism facilitated the smooth landing of a democratic setup from the existing oligarchic rule in Nepal. The Rana regime collapsed in 1950, making way for a coalition government headed by the last Rana Prime Minister Mohan Shamsher JBR, which included the Ranas and Nepali Congress members. Curiously, the 1950 treaty of peace and friendship with India could not cement Mohan Shamsher’s authority and his family rule. This was perhaps in the greater interest of the Nepali people. King Tribhuvan soon declared Constituent Assembly election to draft a people’s constitution, which can be interpreted as an offshoot of Nehru’s idealism on India’s near abroad.
On Dec. 5, 1951, on the request of Nepali Ambassador to India, General Vijaya Shamsher, who was the son of Mohan Sumsher, Nehru penned a letter to Nepali PM Matrika Prasad Koirala. In the letter Nehru was full of respect for Mohan Sumsher, the outgoing Nepali PM, whom he addressed as “His Highness Maharaja.” Nehru suggested in the letter that the Maharaja not shift to India, but stay in Nepal and visit India from time to time. Writes Nehru of the ailing Mohan Sumsher: “He is an old man now and has seen many changes which naturally have shaken him up a great deal. He is entitled to every courtesy and good treatment.”
When we go through the correspondence between Nehru and PM MP Koirala and Nehru and king Tribhuvan, the Indian Prime Minister address the Nepali king as a friend. He addresses PM Koirala as Matrika Prasadji and also as Matrika babu, which hinted of close, respectful relationship. From such overtures, one can conclude that Nehru treated Nepali dignitaries as equals and there was personal touch when it came to Nepal related issues.
Significantly, serious issues were discussed in the correspondence between MP Koirala and Nehru, and Nehru’s suggestions sought, not because he was the Indian PM but because he was a senior leader known personally to the Nepali leaders. He was one of the real well-wishers of Nepal in the then Indian establishment. In this context, it is important to view Prof. SD Muni’s recent disclosure that king Tribhuvan was ready to surrender Nepal’s sovereignty to India, which India declined. The disclosure comes under a cloud of suspicion since the correspondence between Jawaharlal Nehru and the king at the time was carried out with utmost discretion, with only a very small trusted group of people in the know.
National realism is the guiding principle of Nehru’s implicit and explicit overtures to the matters relating to Nepal’s foreign affairs. His advises Nepal to be cautious about engaging Americans and Chinese showed he cared for Indian security and wanted a coordinated foreign policy vis-à-vis Nepal. Interestingly, despite repeated suggestions from Nehru, Nepal successfully established contact in 1954 with the then Chinese ambassador to India through the then Nepali Ambassador, paving the way for opening of diplomatic channels with China.
It may not be unjust to call Nehru’s diplomacy application of straightforward foreign policy. His simplicity can be traced in his letter to PM Koirala written on June 24, 1954 on the talk he had with the then Chinese PM Chou En–lai. Writes Nehru, “I was favorably impressed by Chou En-lai… He is by no means as narrow-mined person as communists often are. He was anxious to understand South and South-East Asia and he told me frankly that he did not know very much about these countries and wanted me to enlighten him.”
Nehru appears to have been impressed by En-lai’s astute diplomacy, particularly when it came to addressing Nehru’s concerns with Communist parties and international communism. Nehru further writes, “He told me that he thought these local communist parties were very foolish and that there was no question whatsoever of trying to create trouble in other counties.” Through these correspondences it appears that Nehru was more a straightforward political leader than a seasoned diplomat. In the end, it turned out that Nehru had completely misread the Chinese leadership.
As was the case with Nepal, India’s relationship with China was also shaped by Nehru’s personal idealism. Sadly, although Nehru at times did seem to believe in hardheaded realism as the guiding principle of India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Nepal, subsequent Indian diplomats have tended to view Nepal more through his idealistic lenses.
The author is ex-election commissioner